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Chapter VI
General Rules of Evidence
under the WTO Jurisprudence


OUTLINE

I Burden of Proof under the WTO Jurisprudence
(ⅰ) General Rules Well Established in Violation Complaints
(ⅱ) Burden of Proof in case of Invoking an Exception
(ⅲ) Special Rules Concerning Non-Violation Claims
(ⅳ) Summary and Conclusions
II Admissibility of Certain Evidences
(ⅰ) Evidence Obtained from Prior Consultations
(a) Procedural Concern: Confidentiality of Consultations
(b) Substantial Concern: Necessity or Relevance of Evidence
(ⅱ) Arguments before Domestic Investigative Authorities
(ⅲ) Arguments Submitted after the First Substantive Meeting
(a) There is a significant difference between the claims and the arguments supporting those claims.
(b)There is no provision establishing precise deadlines for the presentation of evidence.
III Panel’s Right to Seek Information
(ⅰ) A Grant of Discretionary Authority
(ⅱ) The Admissibility of Non-requested Information
(ⅲ) Summary and Conclusions
IV Adverse Inferences from Party’s Refusal to Provide Information Requested
(ⅰ) The Authority of a Panel to Request Information from a Party to the Dispute
(ⅱ) The Duty of a Member to Comply with the Request of a Panel to Provide Information
(ⅲ) The Drawing of Adverse Inferences from the Refusal of a Party to Provide Information Requested by the Panel
V Concluding Remarks

I Burden of Proof under the WTO Jurisprudence
Generally, the question of whether a member acted in accordance with the agreement hinges frequently on whether and to what extent that member must demonstrate compliance or the complaint must demonstrate a lack of compliance. It is demonstrated that the burden of proof is a procedural concept which speaks to the fair and orderly management and disposition of a dispute. This is the issue of “the ultimate burden of proof for establishing a claim or a defence”. In this respect, the Panel Report on US-Copyright Act (DS160) states, “[w]hile a duty rests on all parties to produce evidence and to cooperate in presenting evidence to the Panel, this is an issue that has to be distinguished from the question of who bears the ultimate burden of proof for establishing a claim or a defence”.1
(i) General Rules Well Established in Violation Complaints
Art. 3.8 of the DSU provides that in cases where there is an infringement of the obligations assumed under a covered agreement -- that is, in cases where a violation is established -- there is a presumption of nullification or impairment. However, the issue of burden of proof here is not what happens after a violation is established; the issue is which party must first show that there is, or is not, a violation. In this respect, a number of GATT 1947 panel reports contain language supporting the proposition that the burden of establishing a violation under Article XXIII:1(a) of the GATT 1947 was on the complaining party, i.e., it was for the complaining party to present a prima facie case of violation before a panel. This rule is taken on by the DSB.
With regard to the issue of burden of proof, the Appellate Body in US-Shirts and Blouses (DS33) rules that: “In addressing this issue, we find it difficult, indeed, to see how any system of judicial settlement could work if it incorporated the proposition that the mere assertion of a claim might amount to proof. It is, thus, hardly surprising that various international tribunals, including the International Court of Justice, have generally and consistently accepted and applied the rule that the party who asserts a fact, whether the claimant or the respondent, is responsible for providing proof thereof. Also, it is a generally-accepted canon of evidence in civil law, common law and, in fact, most jurisdictions, that the burden of proof rests upon the party, whether complaining or defending, who asserts the affirmative of a particular claim or defence. If that party adduces evidence sufficient to raise a presumption that what is claimed is true, the burden then shifts to the other party, who will fail unless it adduces sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption.” 2And this ruling is demonstrated to be well established in subsequent cases as a general rule concerning burden of proof.
For example, in Argentina-Leather (DS155), the Panel states: “The relevant rules concerning burden of proof, while not expressly provided for in the DSU, are well established in WTO jurisprudence. The general rule is set out in the Appellate Body report on United States - Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses, wherein it is stated that: ‘It is a generally-accepted canon of evidence in civil law, common law and, in fact, most jurisdictions, that the burden of proof rests upon the party, whether complaining or defending, who asserts the affirmative of a particular claim or defence. If that party adduces evidence sufficient to raise a presumption that what is claimed is true, the burden then shifts to the other party, who will fail unless it adduces sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption’.” 3
And in US-Cotton Yarn (DS192), the Panel rules in pertinent part: “The Appellate Body and subsequent panels endorsed this principle that a complainant bears the burden of proof. For example, the Appellate Body, in EC - Hormones, states as follows: ‘… The initial burden lies on the complaining party, which must establish a prima facie case of inconsistency with a particular provision of the SPS Agreement on the part of the defending party, or more precisely, of its SPS measure or measures complained about. When that prima facie case is made, the burden of proof moves to the defending party, which must in turn counter or refute the claimed inconsistency. This seems straightforward enough and is in conformity with our ruling in United States - Shirts and Blouses, which the Panel invokes and which embodies a rule applicable in any adversarial proceedings.’” 4
As a whole, on the one hand, as ruled by the Panel in Argentina-Ceramic Floor Tiles (DS189), “[w]e recall that the burden of proof in WTO dispute settlement proceedings rests with the party that asserts the affirmative of a particular claim or defence. It implies that the complaining party will be required to make a prima facie case of violation of the relevant provisions of the WTO Agreement, which is for the defendant…to refute. In this regard, the Appellate Body has stated that ‘... a prima facie case is one which, in the absence of effective refutation by the defending party, requires a panel, as a matter of law, to rule in favour of the complaining party presenting the prima facie case’…”; 5 on the other hand, as noted in the Panel Report on US-Copyright Act (DS160), “[t]he same rules apply where the existence of a specific fact is alleged. We note that a party who asserts a fact, whether the claimant or the respondent, is responsible for providing proof thereof. It is for the party alleging the fact to prove its existence. It is then for the other party to submit evidence to the contrary if it challenges the existence of that fact”. 6
In sum, with respect to the general rules of burden of proof in the context of violation complaints, as ruled by the Panel in Japan-Film (DS44): “[w]e note that as in all cases under the WTO/GATT dispute settlement system - and, indeed, as the Appellate Body recently stated, under most systems of jurisprudence - it is for the party asserting a fact, claim or defence to bear the burden of providing proof thereof. Once that party has put forward sufficient evidence to raise a presumption that what is claimed is true, the burden of producing evidence then shifts to the other party to rebut the presumption.…”. 7Certainly, as noted by the Appellate Body in US-Shirts and Blouses (DS33), “[i]n the context of the GATT 1994 and the WTO Agreement precisely how much and precisely what kind of evidence will be required to establish such a presumption will necessarily vary from measure to measure, provision to provision and case to case”.8
(ii) Burden of Proof in case of Invoking an Exception
As discussed above, generally, the burden of proof rests upon the party, whether complaining or defending, who asserts a fact or the affirmative of a particular claim or defence. As to be shown, this rule applies equally even in case of invoking an exception.
In this context, it is a general principle of law, well-established by panels in prior GATT/WTO practice, that the party (the defendant) which invokes an exception in order to justify its action carries the burden of proof that it has fulfilled the conditions for invoking the exception. However, in the author’s view, to understand the issue concerning burden of proof in case of invoking an exception, which is different from the relatively clear burden of establishing a prima facie case of violation on the complaining party, it’s helpful to stress some points here, among which the key point is to be cautious while determine which defence is “affirmative” and therefore burdens the defendant to provide sufficient evidence to rebut the challenged violation.
In United States-Shirts and Blouses (DS33), India argues that it was “customary GATT practice” that the party invoking a provision which had been identified as an exception must offer proof that the conditions set out in that provision were met. The Appellate Body acknowledges that several GATT 1947 and WTO panels have required such proof of a party invoking a defence, such as those found in Art. XX or Art. XI:2(c)(i), to a claim of violation of a GATT obligation, such as those found in Arts. I:1, II:1, III or XI:1. Arts. XX and XI:(2)(c)(i) are limited exceptions from obligations under certain other provisions of the GATT 1994, not positive rules establishing obligations in themselves. They are in the nature of affirmative defences. It is only reasonable that the burden of establishing such a defence, i.e. invoking an exception in the nature of affirmative defences, should rest on the party asserting it. 9
However, as ruled by the Appellate Body in EC-Hormones (DS26/DS48), “[t]he general rule in a dispute settlement proceeding requiring a complaining party to establish a prima facie case of inconsistency with a provision of …[the covered agreements] before the burden of showing consistency with that provision is taken on by the defending party, is not avoided by simply describing that same provision as an ‘exception’. In much the same way, merely characterizing a treaty provision as an ‘exception’ does not by itself justify a ‘stricter’ or ‘narrower’ interpretation of that provision than would be warranted by examination of the ordinary meaning of the actual treaty words, viewed in context and in the light of the treaty's object and purpose, or, in other words, by applying the normal rules of treaty interpretation. It is also well to remember that a prima facie case is one which, in the absence of effective refutation by the defending party, requires a panel, as a matter of law, to rule in favour of the complaining party presenting the prima facie case.” 10
In short, during the process of the establishment of a violation, it’s generally up to the complainant to provide evidence concerning inconsistency, and only in case of limited exceptions the burden of proof rests upon the defending party invoking a defence in the nature of affirmative defences, such as those found in Art. XX or Art. XI:2(c)(i) of the GATT 1994.
(iii) Special Rules Concerning Non-Violation Claims
As suggested by the corresponding provisions, the most significant difference between violation complaints under Art. XXIII:1(a) of the GATT 1994 and non-violation ones under Art. XXIII:1(b) is, while, when violation complaints are brought under Art. XXIII:1(a), the infringement of an obligation of the agreements is considered prima facie to constitute a case of nullification or impairment, from the fact of violation alone, by establishing a formal presumption, such a presumption does not exist in non-violation cases.
With the lack of such a presumption, and given the nature of the factually complex disputes and particular claims of non-violation nullification or impairment, the resolution of issues relating to the proper allocation of the burden of proof is of particular importance. In case of non-violation nullification or impairment, i.e., where the application of Art. XXIII:1(b) is concerned, Art. 26.1(a) of the DSU and panel practice in the context of the WTO Agreement and GATT jurisprudence confirm that this is an exceptional course of action for which the complaining party bears the burden of providing a detailed justification to back up its allegations.
This requirement has been recognized and applied by a number of GATT panels. For example, the panel on Uruguayan Recourse to Art. XXIII noted that in cases “where there is no infringement of GATT provisions, it would be ... incumbent on the country invoking Article XXIII to demonstrate the grounds and reasons for its invocation. Detailed submissions on the part of that contracting party on these points were therefore essential for a judgement to be made under this Article”. And the panel on US - Agricultural Waiver noted, in applying the 1979 codification of this rule: “The party bringing a complaint under [Article XXIII:1(b)] would normally be expected to explain in detail that benefits accruing to it under a tariff concession have been nullified or impaired”.
Art. 26.1(a) of the DSU codifies the prior GATT practice, which provides in relevant part: “the complaining party shall present a detailed justification in support of any complaint relating to a measure which does not conflict with the relevant covered agreement ...”.
　　【案情简介】
　　2012年5月14日，某歌厅李老板前往另一歌厅，因自己开办歌厅的领班跳槽去往这家歌厅，两家歌厅之间没有谈成，李老板开车堵住王老板歌厅的大门，后经公安出警疏散，第二天李老板派手下刘某再次去找王老板，王老板怕出事，便买了六根棒球棒准备自卫，刘某到歌厅后，被王老板歌厅的服务生持棒殴打成轻伤，刘某的同伙前往歌厅，将歌厅的五个服务生打成轻微伤，当晚警方
将所有参与打斗的双方控制起来。检方将王某及其六名服务生以聚众斗殴罪提起诉讼，将刘某及同伙以寻衅滋事罪起诉诉讼。
【罪名之争】
王某及其服务生委托的辩护律师经过认真分析，并会见查阅全案证据后，认为王某的行为不构成聚众斗殴犯罪，检方起诉的罪名有误。
起诉书指控王某构成聚众斗殴罪的证据不足，不能认定王某构成刑事犯罪：
经2012年11月15日及12月13日两次庭审，公诉方就其指控“聚众斗殴罪”，首次庭审提供了七被告人的七份供述作为主要证据；第二次庭审提供七被告人二十一份供述为补充证据，全案证据构成以被告人供述为重点。公诉方不能提供证明犯罪构成主观方面的证据；不能提供王某系首要分子的证据；不能提供王某明知严重危害公共秩序的证据；不能提供证据证明王某具有组织、策划、指挥、领导犯罪且希望危害结果发生的主观动机；不能证明王某具有报复、争霸一方、寻求刺激、公然藐视国家法律和社会公德的证据。
【法理辩析】
一、事实认定离不开法律规范，“聚众斗殴罪”的法律特征与本案客观事实情况对比判断，公诉升格为“聚众斗殴罪”的问题在于客观归罪，脱离“主客观相一致”的定罪处刑原则：
《刑法》第二百九十二条、第九十七条规定，正确认定聚众斗殴罪及首要分子，必须具备以下法律特征：
1、要有拉帮结伙、聚众斗殴故意互相殴斗的行为；
【司法实践】最高人民法院指南规定，要严格掌握聚众斗殴行为的定罪标准，防止把一些情节轻微危害不大的行为以聚众斗殴犯罪论处。
【本案情况】起诉指控不能证明本案被告人为聚众斗殴而拉帮结伙。
2、聚众斗殴通常表现为报复他人、争霸一方或者其他不正当动机而成帮结伙地斗殴，往往造成严重后果。
【司法指南】对于因民事纠纷引发的互相斗殴甚至结伙械斗、规模不大、危害不严重的，不宜以聚众斗殴罪处理，构成其他罪的以其他罪处理。
【本案事实】因民事争议引起的殴打，规模不大，危害不大，不宜按聚众斗殴罪处理。
3、“聚众”是指为实施斗殴而聚集三人以上的行为。
【聚众特征】为斗殴而聚众，应当区别王老板位员工因维护王老板位利益，集体应对外来风险的情形。
【本案特性】被告人均系同一王老板位的员工，不能据此就对号入座为“聚众”，被告人王某没有预谋聚众斗殴，第二至第七被告人否认王某有过聚众斗殴的预谋或安排，公诉指控缺乏组织、指挥、策划的证据，不能认定聚众斗殴。
4、“斗殴”必然是本方与对方相互之间共同行为，应同罪同罚，不可同样的情况不同对待。
【认定斗殴】参与双方均有互殴的故意；如果没有互殴行为的，不以聚众斗殴罪论处，构成其他罪的，以其他罪论处。
【本案情况】只有第二至第七告殴打刘某某，刘某某没有互殴，与“聚众斗殴罪”的法律特征明显不符。配套司法解释规定要求，应当注意区分“聚众斗殴”与“共同伤害”的界限，对于一方有明显伤害故意的，直接以故意伤害处理，公诉方起诉的事实符合共同伤害的犯罪特征。
5、聚众斗殴罪的客观要件表明，不仅要有“聚众”行为，而且要有“斗殴”行为。
【司法实践】特别强调要注意区分“聚众斗殴罪”与“共同伤害罪”之间的界限，公诉方的起诉是简王老板地将多人共同实施的伤害行为错误地认定为“聚众斗殴”。
【本案事实】既无聚众行为，也无斗殴行为，系员工自主行为，仅是共同伤害李某。
6、起诉错误判断了“公共秩序”受到严重危害，无证据证明公共秩序受损，聚众斗殴犯罪的客体不存在受到侵害后果：
【法律要件】聚众斗殴罪的“客体要件”是公共秩序受到危害；“公共秩序”指人们在社会公共生活中遵守的准则，不应简王老板地理解为公共场所的秩序。司法实践中聚众斗殴行为较多地发生在公共场所，但其侵犯的主要不是特定的个人或者特定的公私财物，而且由于行为人公然藐视法纪和社会公德，公然向社会挑战，破坏公共秩序。掌握社会“公共秩序”严重混乱程度的标准是“生活、工作、学习、教育、科研等秩序”遭到破坏，造成学校停课、商店、厂矿停业、交通严重阻塞等公共秩序严重混乱。
【本案情况】案发在被告人歌厅内部四楼，针对的是特定的刘某某本人，未造成诸如停产、停业、阻塞交通、危害公众利益等公共秩序的混乱。不能仅凭“持械、多人或有轻伤”等部分客观事实就认定“持械聚众斗殴罪”。
二、 准确定性本案，须分清两个界限：
1、必须分清“聚众斗殴罪”与“群众中因民事纠纷而互相斗殴或者结伙械斗”的界限：主要表现在后者不具有流氓罪的动机、目的，不是流氓活动；在群众中互相斗殴或械斗中犯故意伤害的（包括轻伤、重伤），本质上后者事出有因，不具有争霸一方、报复他人、寻求刺激等犯罪动机，其行为没有对社会公共秩序构成威胁。本案是两家歌厅之间因“领班”跳槽引起的民事争议，因此，不能以聚众斗殴罪定性。
2、必须分清“聚众斗殴罪”与“故意伤害罪”的界限：
两罪的根本标志在于犯罪动机的不同，“聚众斗殴”中的伤害行为表现为称王称霸、充英雄好汉而惹事生非，报有与对方争高低的主观愿望；“故意伤害罪”中的伤害行为，事先具有明确的伤害对象，临时起意伤害也往往是因为双方发生纠纷的原因明显在对方一边，本案的情况符合共同故意伤害的构成要件。
三 、正确定性本案为共同故意伤害的法律依据：
1、《最高人民法院 最高人民检察院关于当前办理流氓案件中具体应用法律的若干问题的解答》怎样认定流氓罪？答：“聚众斗殴”一般是指出于私仇、争霸或者其他流氓动机而成帮结伙地斗殴，往往造成严重后果。“聚众斗殴罪”源于七九刑法第一百六十条“流氓罪”分离，虽然罪名有所更新，但两者具有沿革、承继关系。
2、最高法、最高检关于“怎样区分流氓罪和与其相近似的其他犯罪的界限？”强调，因民事纠纷而互相斗殴甚至结伙械斗，不应按流氓罪处理。其中犯故意伤害罪（包括轻伤、重伤）或故意毁坏公私财物等罪的，是什么罪就定什么罪。
3、《关于怎样认定和处理流氓集团的意见》第三部分 认定流氓集团应当注意区分的界限（四）群众之间因某些纠纷而引起多人互殴的，不构成流氓罪。
4、最高人民法院关于执行《中华人民共和国刑事诉讼法》若干问题的解释第一百七十六条规定：案件事实清楚，证据确实、充分，依据法律认定被告人无罪的，应当判决宣告被告人无罪；证据不足，不能认定被告人有罪的，应当以证据不足，指控的犯罪不能成立，判决宣告被告人无罪；起诉指控的事实清楚，证据确实、充分，指控的罪名与人民法院审理认定的罪名不一致的，应当作出有罪判决；案件事实部分清楚，证据确实、充分的，应当依法作出有罪或者无罪的判决；事实不清，证据不足部分，依法不予认定；第一百一十六条：人民法院对人民检察院提起的公诉案件审查以下内容：起诉书指控的被告人的身份、实施犯罪的时间、地点、手段、犯罪事实、危害后果和罪名以及其他可能影响定罪量刑的情节等是否明确；侦查、起诉程序的各种法律手续和诉讼文书复印件是否完备；同种类多个证据中被确定为主要证据的；如果某一种类证据中只有一个证据，该证据即为主要证据。公诉方提供了二十份“到案说明”存在问题，应当提供经被告人签名确认的《刑事拘留决定》及《批捕决定》，据此查实到案时间。
四、依据《刑事诉讼法》第四十六条规定，对一切案件的判决都要重证据，重调查研究，不轻信口供。只有被告人供述，没有其他证据的，不能认定被告人有罪和处以刑罚：
2012年5月15日“二告服务生1”供述：事发因张某；王某没有指示；看别人拿自己就拿；拿棒子是不想让“刘某某”上来找王老板总；2012年5月28日“三告服务生2”供述：纠纷因张某而起、门卫用对讲机喊昨天闹事的人又来了、没人让我拿棒子，我看到别人拿我就拿了，就是想吓唬刘某某；2012年5月15日“四告服务生3”供述：因张某引起两家歌厅的矛盾、五告服务生4说别吃亏、听门卫在门口喊、我们在大厅的人都跑到音控室拿了棒子、怕来人闹事防身用、没人让拿；2012年5月15日“六告服务生5”供述：我是负责管理服务员的经理、听到门卫喊有人上来了、没有人说让拿棒子、拿棒子是自我防范，我听对讲机里门卫说“有人上来了，注意点”；2012年5月15日“五告服务生4”供述：我是歌厅法人、出资三十万，两家歌厅产生矛盾、服务生用对讲机喊刘某某上楼了、我让服务生把刘某某推走；2012年5月15日“门卫”供述：用对讲机告诉楼上的人注意点；2012年6月6日“刘某某”供述：打架是因为歌厅小姐，我和王老板不认识，没有矛盾；2012年6月1日张某供述：矛盾因我而起、刘某某是歌厅看场子的；2012年5月15日“王某”供述：说让大家准备好的意见是防止吃亏；怎么打我没看见。
从上述各被告人之间的供述查知：关于是否“聚众”“斗殴”行为，均无明确证言，各被告人供述没有关于王某指使、授意、组织、策划、指挥等事实，各被告人的供述之间相互印证之处是两家歌厅之间因张某产生民事纠纷。
被告人供述和辩解、被害人陈述的内容中，主要情节明显不一致，足以影响聚众斗殴定性定罪，公诉人对王某的供述使用猜测、评论、推断的眼光看待，没有充分认识本意。
六、起诉方关于“默示授意”的提法系主观推断，与司法实践及最高法相关司法解释规定认定聚众斗殴的法律特点不符。
中国检察出版社2011年8月份出版的侦查监督业务指导众书第8个案例，选的是北京高检对类似本案的聚众斗殴罪的法理分析，缺乏主观要件的，不构成聚众斗殴罪。依据刑事司法实践，对于相同或类似的案件，在法理上不能作出过于悬殊的认定，否则就是罪刑不相当。北京市高级检察院案例指导认为：众当事人的主观和事件发展过程具体表现来看，其并不具有聚众斗殴的主观故意。聚众斗殴犯罪不仅要看行为人所实施的行为，还要具体分析行为人的主观动机和犯罪动机，以避免客观归罪的现象发生。《刑法》第二百九十二条对聚众斗殴罪采简王老板罪状的方式加以规定，导致司法实践中对本罪的处理做法不一，不具有可操作性，在立法机关、司法部门未做出明确指导意见时，根据现行司法实践中的合理经验，定罪处刑应慎重处理，严格依据证据裁判原则，坚持世界各国通用的疑罪必须“从有利于被告人”的角度裁判的核心价值。辩护律师张生贵13240422999